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“…in any community in which class distinctions are somewhat 
vague, all canons of reputability and decency, and all standards of 
consumption, are traced back by insensible gradations to the 
usages and habits of thoughts of the highest social and pecuniary 
class” (Veblen 1899: 104) 
 
“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady steam of 
enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes a 
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation” (Keynes 1936: 159). 
 
“The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental 
production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those 
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it” (Marx 
1846). 
 
ABSTRACT: Inequality increased dramatically in the decades leading up to the financial crises 
of both 1929 and 2008. Yet students of both crises have largely ignored any role that rising   2
inequality might have played in rendering the financial sector more vulnerable to systemic 
dysfunction. This study draws upon the work of Thorstein Veblen, Michal Kalecki, and Karl 
Marx to clarify the manner in which growing inequality prior to both crises made U.S. financial 
markets more prone to systemic dysfunction. Greater inequality generated three dynamics that 
heightened conditions in which these financial crises might occur. The first is that greater 
inequality meant that individuals were forced to struggle harder to find ways to consume more to 
maintain their relative social status, thereby reducing their savings and increasing their 
indebtedness. The second is that holding ever greater income and wealth, the elite flooded 
financial markets with credit, helping keep interest rates low and encouraging the creation of 
new credit instruments. The third dynamic is that, as the rich took larger shares of income and 
wealth, they gained more command over ideology and hence politics. Reducing the size of 
government, tax cuts for the rich, deregulating the economy, and failing to regulate newly 
evolving credit instruments flowed out of this ideology. 
 
  The financial crisis of 2008 has prompted research into its commonalities with that of 
1929 and a search for common causes. Most scholars agree that in both instances low interest 
rates, financial innovation, and laissez-faire ideology supporting lax regulation played important 
causal roles. While this analysis is not incorrect, it addresses proximate as opposed to more 
profound underlying causality. At this deeper level, both crises were in part caused by the 
consequences of dramatically rising inequality.  
There were many differences in the economies that led up to the crises of 1929 and 2008. 
For instance, in 1929, the federal government constituted only about three percent of GDP versus 
about 22 percent in 2008. Whereas extreme speculation on the eve of the current crisis was most   3
visible in the real estate market, it was in the stock market in the late 1920s. Yet beneath such 
differences were striking similarities.   
In both periods, union membership substantially declined, undermining the bargaining 
power of workers; taxes on the rich were cut significantly; income and wealth distribution 
became radically more unequal, forcing households to struggle ever-harder to maintain their 
relative social status, their social respectability; an elite had ever-rising funds to invest, but 
because everyone else had smaller shares to spend, investment potential was greater in the 
financial than the production sector, stimulating innovations in credit instruments; and real estate 
bubbles were critical to both crises.  
In both periods, a wealthy elite’s possession of an ever-rising share of society’s resources 
enabled their increasing command over political ideology, often diverting attention from 
economic to cultural issues. As cultural wars divided the electorate in the post-Reagan era, so too 
the 1920s saw political combat over such issues as evolution, prohibition, immigration, and the 
increasingly militant Klu Klux Klan. 
  But of all the similarities, what was causally most important in setting the stage for both 
crises was a dramatic rise in inequality. Inequality during the preludes to both crises reached 
unparalleled extremes for the 80-year period in which they occurred. Yet students of both crises 
have largely ignored any role that rising inequality might have played in rendering the financial 
sector more vulnerable to systemic dysfunction.
1  
Although the analysis developed in this paper fits into the Keynesian/Kaleckian 
underconsumptionist school, it enriches that perspective by drawing upon Thorstein Veblen’s 
theory of consumer behavior and Karl Marx’s theory of ideology formation to clarify the manner 
in which growing inequality prior to both crises made U.S. financial markets prone to   4
dysfunction. Greater inequality generated three dynamics that heightened conditions in which 
these financial crises might occur. The first is that greater inequality meant that individuals were 
forced to struggle harder to find ways to consume more to maintain their relative social status, 
thereby decreasing their saving and augmenting their indebtedness. The second is that holding 
ever greater income and wealth, an elite flooded financial markets with credit, helping keep 
interest rates low and encouraging the creation of new credit instruments. The third dynamic is 
that, as the rich took larger shares of income and wealth, they gained more command over 
ideology and hence politics. Reducing the size of government, deregulating the economy, and 
failing to regulate newly evolving credit instruments flowed out of this ideology. 
Financial crises have plagued capitalism since its beginning. Recovery was usually quick, 
mostly because the major consequence was the destruction of a great deal of paper wealth held 
by an elite. What distinguishes the crises of 1929 and 2008 is that the speculative mania 
preceding them occurred not only in stock markets, but in real estate markets as well. Real estate 
markets are more democratic than stock markets in that a larger share of the population 
participates in ownership, and thus a collapse of a speculative bubble in real estate has 
consequences that are far greater and potentially far longer lasting. Real estate ownership also 
possesses a social characteristic that is special: for most households it constitutes not only the 
most important store of wealth, but also the most important symbol of social status.  
Rising Inequality 
Since the Civil War, there have been three major explosions in inequality: the first 
between the end of the Civil War until about 1900; the second between World War I and the late 
1920s; and the last between the 1970s and at least 2008. Both of the latter two ended in severe 
crises.   5
The periods leading up to both crises appeared to be highly prosperous. Between 1922 
and 1929, GNP grew at an annual rate of 4.7 percent and unemployment averaged 3.7 percent 
(White 1990: 69). Between 1993 and 2007,GNP growth averaged 3.25 percent (NIPA Tables), 
and unemployment averaged 5.2 percent (BLS). However, in both periods productivity gains 
outpaced wages, with important distributional consequences. As Long noted, “So large is labor’s 
share of national income that any substantial disparity between productivity and real wages 
would exert great impact on the other shares – either largely expropriating them or presenting 
them with huge windfalls”(1960: 112). Accordingly, the share of total income received by the 
richest five percent of the population increased from 24.3 percent in 1919 to 33.5 percent in 
1929. The disposable income of the top one percent of taxpayers rose 63 percent (Livingston 
2009: 38). The number of millionaires increased from 7,000 in 1922 to 30,000 in 1929. (Phillips 
2002: 11). The real prosperity of the 1920s was reserved for those residing in the top of the 
income scale (Bernstein, 1966; Stricker 1985). Contributing to this heightened inequality were 
tax Areforms@ that reduced corporate taxes and lowered the maximum personal income tax rate 
from 65 to 32 percent (Sobel 1968, 52-53).   
Similarly, real disposable income declined for wage earners in the three decades leading 
up to 2008. Average weekly earnings (in 1982 dollars) declined from $331.39 in 1973 to $275.93 
in 2005, greatly lagging behind productivity gains (Miringoff and Opdyke 2008: 226). What is 
especially striking about the two periods is the dramatically larger shares of income and wealth 
accruing to the ultra wealthy, especially the top one-hundredth of one percent (see Figure 1). 
Their income shares soared from about 1.7 to 5 percent in the first period, and from about 0.9 to 
6 percent in the second. 





Rising Inequality and the Struggle for Status Security 
  In the U.S. since colonial times, there has been a widespread belief that vertical mobility 
is readily possible. Consequently, Americans have generally felt responsible for their own social 
status. Through adequate dedication and effort, anyone can move up, even to the very highest 
rungs of social status. Ones social status is not given, but earned.   
However, how hard one works in modern societies is generally not directly observable. 
What more readily catches attention is how much one can consume, which can stand, more or 
less, as a proxy for how hard one has worked.Thus, because Americans believe they are 
individually responsible for their own social standing, they feel strongly compelled to 
demonstrate status and through consumption. Greater inequality means that consumers must 
stretch further to move up, or even maintain their relative social standing. 
An attempt to maintain or increase social standing through consumption is what Veblen 
meant by conspicuous consumption. His theory of consumer behavior is founded upon the fact 
that social status is critically important to people and thus strongly affects their behavior. 
Ultimately underpinning social status or respectability is the need for self-esteem or self-respect, 
what John Rawls suggested to be “perhaps the most important primary good” such that without it 
nothing else has much value (1971: 440). 
  Where there is a strong belief that vertical mobility is possible, a substantial increase in 
inequality could be expected to prompt households to respond in one or more of three ways to   7
maintain social standing: consume more and thus save less; become more indebted; or increase 
work hours. As the evidence presented below demonstrates, as a whole, U.S. households did two 
of the three during the 1920s and all three during the three decades leading up to 2008 as 
inequality increased.  
Automobiles, Houses, and Social Status 
The automobile industry expanded dramatically from the very beginning of the century 
up until 1929, when over four million vehicles were produced, a level not attained again until 
1949. Two of every three families owned cars by 1929 (Livingston 1994: 108).   
Arguably, no single new consumer good had heretofore more transformed society than 
the automobile. Not only was the automobile a symbol of status, it also helped fuel a housing 
boom by making suburban living more viable. Because suburban land was less expensive, 
housing could be in individual units as opposed to the multi-unit apartment buildings on more 
expensive in-town land. A detached house has far greater potential for revealing status than units 
encased within an apartment complex.  
The importance of the automobile and free-standing houses as status symbols is such that 
both played critical roles in the struggle for status stability as inequality rose prior to both crises. 
The fundamental reason, as Wilkinson and Pickett point out, is that “research confirms that the 
tendency to look for goods which confer status and prestige is indeed stronger for things which 
are more visible to others” (2009: 225). 
  During the 1920s, as the wealthy took every larger shares of total income, they bought 
ever-more expensive houses, vacation properties, automobiles, country club memberships and 
other luxury items.
2 Automobiles made possible the dramatic expansion of private playgrounds 
for the rich – so-called country clubs. The real estate boom was especially robust in vacation   8
facilities such as hotels, tourist cottages, and motor courts (Grebler, et. al. 1956). This put intense 
pressure on all with lower incomes to consume more to maintain their relative social standing.
3 
  The same basic scenario played out again over the three decades of rising inequality prior 
to the crisis of 2008. The struggle to keep up was especially intense in housing. As those at the 
pinnacle of wealth and income competed among themselves for status, they bought and had 
constructed ever-larger mansions, thereby degrading the status quality of homes owned or 
occupied by everyone beneath them. Because houses and cars are principal symbols of status, 
there was an explosion in the consumption of so-called McMansions and extremely expensive 
cars. In face of the intense competition to keep up, not surprisingly, a February 2008 Pew survey 
found that “the proportion of wealthy Americans who say they are very satisfied with their 
housing and cars … has declined considerably since 2001” (Pew Research Center 2008). As the 
wealthiest Americans received ever-larger income shares and increased their consumption more-
or-less proportionately, they reduced the subjective value of consumption levels below them.
4 
As inequality dramatically increased, the struggle by households to maintain their relative 
status resulted in reduced saving,
5 greater indebtedness, and prior to 2008, more work hours for 
households. Personal saving as a percent of disposable income declined from 6.4 percent in the 
1898-1916 period to 3.8 percent in the 1922-1929 period (Olney 1991: 48). In the decades before 
2008, it fell from 10.4 percent in 1980-84, to 7.7 percent in 1985-89, to 6.5 percent in 1990-94, 
to 3.8 percent in 1995-99, to 2.1 percent in 2000-04; and became negative in 2005 and 2006.  
In their struggle to maintain their relative status in face of rising inequality, Americans 
became more indebted. Debt as a percent of income increased from 4.64 percent in 1919 to 9.34 
percent in 1929 (Olney 1991: 88-89). Total consumer debt, which was $3 billion in 1920, rose to 
$7.2 billion by 1929 (Bernstein 1998: 194).
6 In the decades prior to 2008, average consumer   9
household debt as a percent of income increased from 88 in 1989 to 150 in 2007 (Survey of 
Consumer Finances). Although this increased indebtedness held for households in all income 
quintiles, not unexpectedly, debt increased more for lower income groups.   
This rise in indebtedness in both periods fits the Veblenian hypothesis that in a society in 
which vertical mobility is believed to be highly fluid, increasing gaps in income all along the 
spectrum stimulate everyone to struggle harder to meet their consumption status targets,
7 as those 
at the very top compete among themselves for the very pinnacle of status.
8   
A third possible response of households in their struggle to maintain their relative social 
standing in the face of rising inequality is to work longer hours. Although the work week 
continued its contraction during the 1920s, Bernstein notes that “New expectations regarding 
appropriate family income levels… encouraged more women to enter the labor market” (1998: 
195). In the later period, the increase in work hours is more striking. As inequality rose 
dramatically between 1970 and 2002, work hours per capita rose 20 percent in the U.S. By 
contrast, in the European Union where income inequality increased far less, work hours fell 12 
percent (OECD 2004, Chapter 1).   
Inequality and Speculative Excess 
  Productivity gains significantly outpaced wage gains in the periods preceding both crises, 
resulting in labor’s share of total income declining as that of capital increased. Despite a drop in 
the share of income of those with the highest marginal propensity to consume, growth continued 
in a positive direction. In both periods, economic growth was, in Kalecki’s terms, profit-led as 
opposed to wage-led.  
Lagging wages during the 1920s were due in part to technological innovations that were 
predominantly laborsaving and concentrated in manufacturing, causing a shift in demand for   10
labor away from unskilled toward more skilled labor.
9 Low-skilled assembly-line workers were 
being replaced by laborsaving capital while the demand for more skilled workers such as 
machine repairmen increased, resulting in lower wages for the former relative to the latter (Hall 
and Ferguson 1998: 21).
10 Although total manufacturing output increased by 64 percent during 
the decade, the total number of workers in the sector remained almost constant (Stricker 1983-
84). Consequently, the share of wages in manufacturing revenues declined from 52 percent in 
1922 to 43 percent in 1929.
11 With prices and wages fairly stable, increasing productivity flowed 
predominantly to corporate profits, increasing them 62 percent, enabling dividends to double.
12 
The result was that the disposable income of the richest one percent of the population rose by 63 
percent (Livingston 1994: 114-15). 
  Similarly, in the three decades preceding 2008, wages lagged due to labor-displacing 
innovations, as well as increasing international trade that exported significant numbers of 
manufacturing jobs.
13  
During the 1920s, and the three decades preceding the financial crisis of 2008, the 
increased share of income and wealth accruing to the elite was far greater than could readily be 
spent, even on the most lavish consumption.
14 Thus in both periods an elite had additional saving 
and they and their money managers sought to place these increased assets to maximum effect. 
But given the fact that those who spend most or all of their income had a smaller share of total 
income, profitable investment potential in the real economy was limited.
15 As a result, funds 
flowed into the financial sector, where they increased employment by 400,000 between 1925 and 
1929 (Stricker 1983-84: 53). 
Although new consumer durable goods such as automobiles, refrigerators, electric irons, 
and radios were driving forces for much of the economic dynamism of the early decades of the   11
twentieth century, rapidly rising inequality during the 1920s constrained the demand for these 
products. Although installment credit permitted consumers to continue increasing their 
purchases, rising indebtedness meant that this would ultimately be limited by creditworthiness. 
As Stricker has put it, “Consumption-demand lagged behind potential output of consumption 
goods, and only installment credit and upper-class consumption smoothed over that problem for 
a while” (1983-84: 55). In addition, robust increases in productivity further reduced the need to 
invest in these industries. Investment in plant and equipment declined from $15.5 billion in 1926 
to about $14.5 billion annually over the next three years (Stricker 1983-84: 51). Investment in 
construction also declined in the late 1920s (Stricker 1983-84: 52).   
  In 1970, the labor share comprised 60 percent of GDP while capital received 24 percent. 
In 2006, labor’s share was 50 percent and capital’s 29 percent (BEA NIPA). The resulting 
inequality meant that an elite had additional saving and they and their money managers sought to 
place these increased assets to maximum effect. But given the fact that those who spend most or 
all of their income had a smaller share of total income to spend, profitable investment potential 
in the real economy was limited. In his memoirs, Alan Greenspan took note of this lack of 
profitable investment outlets: “intended investment in the United States has been lagging in 
recent years …presumably for lack of new investment opportunities” (2007: 387).   
  In the six years preceding the 2008 crisis, firms were investing less than their retained 
earnings – the longest period of such business behavior since the Second World War --, even as 
corporate profits as a share of national income nearly doubled. But these profits soared especially 
in the financial sector. Whereas financial sector profits have generally constituted about 10-15 
percent of corporate profit, they jumped to 40 percent in 2007 (Stiglitz 2008: 36). In response to 
this profit shift, the finance, insurance, and real estate sector rose from 14.9 percent to 20.6   12
percent between 1974 and 2004 (President of the United States 2006, Table B12, 296-97). Major 
manufacturing firms such as General Motors, Ford, and General Electric developed increasingly 
powerful financial departments. By 2000, General Electric received more income from financial 
transactions than from manufacturing. This shift from the productive to the financial sector also 
shows up in compensation. Average compensation in the financial sector that was close to parity 
with that of domestic private industries between 1948 and 1982, was 181 percent of higher by 
2007 (Johnson 2009). 
The financial crisis of 2008 was able to sneak up on the economy because the dominant 
focus was on surface reality, on the fact, for instance, that between 1991 and 2006 growth 
averaged 3.22 percent and inflation never went above four percent. However, beneath the 
surface, dramatically rising inequality was shifting investment from production to finance and 
speculation.  
Prior to both crises, speculative excesses sequentially occurred in two different sectors, 
albeit in reverse order. In the 1920s, a speculative boom in real estate crashed three years before 
the stock market crash. In the most recent crisis, a stock market boom, fueled by a high tech 
craze, crashed before real estate collapsed six years later. 
Speculative Fever Leading Up to 1929 
Before World War I, homes were often financed by borrowing from family and friends. 
But expansion of financial institutions flush with assets and thus offering attractive credit 
conditions encouraged an increase in institutional borrowing about 45 percent before World War 
One to about 60 percent by 1925. Mortgage lending increased by 55 percent between 1922 and 
1925, fueling a real estate bubble.   
The bubble was pricked by the severe September 1926 hurricane, causing widespread   13
devastation in Florida where the boom had been most robust (Galbraith 1954). Housing prices 
that had soared about 20 percent in the early 1920s, declined by about 10 percent before the 
stock market crash.   
Following the collapse of the real estate market, investment funds flowed more 
aggressively into the stock market, fueled in part by the explosion of investment trusts from 
about 40 in 1921 to more than 750 in 1929 (Carosso 1970). Toward the end of the 1920s, trusts 
came to hold the stocks of other leveraged trusts, creating a ponzi-like structure. Galbraith noted 
that “In 1927 the trusts sold to the public about $400,000,000 worth of securities; in 1929 they 
marketed an estimated three billions worth” (1954: 49-50).
16 
  In the last few years before the crash, rising interest rates prompted an explosion in loans 
by corporations to brokers who were able to command higher returns on margin loans to 
speculators. Hall and Ferguson note that “Loans to brokers totaled $7.63 billion in 1924 and then 
rose to $26.53 billion by 1929…while weekly rates on margin loans averaged 8.56 percent… 
individuals were [receiving] dividends yields averaging 2.92 percent” (1998: 24-25).
17 
Speculative Fever Leading Up to 2008 
  The relative lack of new investment opportunities in the real economy prior to 2008 
created a premium for financial entrepreneurs devising new financial investment instruments. 
Traditionally, banks that originated loans held them until maturity, providing good cause to 
scrutinize well the credit worthiness of the borrowers. What changed is that financial entities 
began to buy up mortgages and credit card debt and then package them in bonds backed by the 
monthly payments of the mortgage borrowers and credit card holders. Between 1980 and 2000, 
this securitized debt expanded 50-fold, whereas bank loans expanded 3.7-fold. By the end of 
2007, two-thirds of all private U.S. debt passed through Wall Street (Wilmers 2009: A19).   14
Although banks no longer needed to be as cautious as to borrowers’ credit risk, “securitization” 
was widely believed to strengthen the financial system by spreading risk more broadly.  
These new tools encouraged more and more wealth to be held in the form of financial 
assets. Along with the booming high tech stocks of the late 1990s, financial assets seemed the 
most promising way to make one’s wealth grow. Indeed, such instruments as hedge funds 
seemed a low risk alternative or complement to the sizzling tech stock market.   
  Nevertheless, with more wealth in the hands of those with less to lose from risky 
investments, the total amount of wealth held in stocks as a share of total assets more than 
doubled from 1983 to the crash in 2001 (Wolff, 2004: 11). By holding more wealth in the form 
of stocks, investors scrambled for ever-higher returns from these investments, generating the tech 
bubble of the late 1990s. While the bursting of this bubble did have some repercussions on the 
real sector, because the bubble was mostly limited to the stock market, its impact was primarily 
felt by those in higher income brackets. In addition, an expanding housing market continued to 
grow through the bursting of the tech bubble, tempering the severity of the 2001 recession. More 
and more wealth was redirected into real estate. Between 2001 and 2007, the market value of 
residential property went up as a percentage of total assets (Bucks 2009, A28). 
With a plethora of credit fueled by expansionary monetary policy, inflow of foreign 
monies,
18 and greater use of financial instruments, financial institutions sought out less credit-
worthy customers, with these loans securitized and sold. Lower-income households were sold 
sub-prime mortgages to purchase housing at increasingly inflated prices. Mortgage lenders saw 
great short-term gain potential in these skyrocketing housing prices. But when low-income 
borrowers could not make their mortgage payments, the collapse was assured.
19    15
What made the crisis of 2008 severe was the breadth of participation. Whereas the 
percentage of households holding equity in their homes had remained at about 64 percent 
between 1975 and 1995, this figure stood at over 69 percent by 2008. In a highly deregulated 
environment, as an elite poured much of its increasing share of income and wealth into the real 
estate market, an extreme speculator’s market evolved (Bucks, 2009: A29).  
 A Richer Elite’s Heightened Command of Ideology 
Given the complexity of shifts in ideology, it is understandably that there would be no 
clear consensus as to why the political pendulum swung dramatically toward laissez-faire 
ideology between World War I and 1929 and in the three decades leading up to 2008. 
Nevertheless, some things stand out. In the first period, the ease with which labor=s failure to 
fulfill its informal wartime Ano strike@ pledge was depicted as unpatriotic at a time when the 
Russian Bolsheviks were introducing an alternative to capitalism. In a “Red Scare” environment, 
labor=s struggles were increasingly portrayed as part of a communist conspiracy, while business 
interests embarked on a campaign to demonstrate the patriotism of business and the dangers 
inherent in labor=s intransigence (Watts 1991).  
In the more recent shift toward laissez faire ideology, the fact that stagflation 
delegitimated Keynesian economics enabled the right to nurture and draw upon a virulent strain 
of neoclassical economics in the form of supply-side economics. Also noteworthy was the loss of 
gold backing of the dollar and its devaluation, loss of the Vietnam War, and presumed lax 
discipline and rising moral degeneracy, as evidenced by sexual promiscuity, sloppy attire, and 
drugs. 
Reinforcing these ideological shifts in both periods was the fact that rising inequality 
meant that the very rich had more resources with which to influence public opinion and policy.   16
Different income and wealth groups have different interests and these interests are captured in 
ideologies that compete in the public sphere. The generation and dissemination of ideology 
requires resources, and thus the larger share of income and wealth accruing to the wealthy was 
destined to have ideological and political consequences.   
  With superior education, and increasing resources, it is understandable that the rich 
would progressively learn to craft their self-serving ideologies so that they become ever-more 
convincing to a majority of the electorate.
20 Their disproportionate control over the media, 
educational institutions and think tanks makes this outcome inevitable. As they received ever-
larger shares of national wealth and income, this process was sped up. Research reveals that their 
expenditures on creating and disseminating ideology yield high returns (Glaeser 2006). 
The Surge of Laissez Faire Ideology During the 1920s 
  The election of 1920 returned control of the federal government to the Republican party, 
such that “Business-oriented Republicans dominated national politics and lobbying efforts in 
Congress” (Edsforth 1998: 246), claiming that the American free-enterprise system promoted the 
values of Asocial harmony, freedom, democracy, the family, the church, and patriotism.@ 
Advocates of Agovernment regulation of the affairs of business@ were characterized as 
subversive (Carey 1995, 27). In an anti-union climate, the courts issued as many anti-labor 
injunctions during the 1920s as during the entire period from 1880 to 1920 (Bernstein 1966, 
2000). The Supreme Court ruled minimum wage legislation in the District of Columbia 
unconstitutional in 1923. Undergirding these decisions was the doctrine of Afreedom of 
contract.@ The right of labor to organize was virtually nonexistent and radical organizations were 
repressed (Edsforth 1998: 247). 
A new media technology, the radio, greatly assisted the dissemination of ideology. The   17
first regular radio broadcast took place in November 1920. By 1923 more than 500 radio stations 
operated in the U.S. and 550,000 radio sets were sold that year. In 1928, 12 million sets catered 
to 40 million listeners (Blanning 2008: 204-05).   
So completely did business dominate the climate of opinion during the 1920s that Roger 
Babson, a powerful investment advisor and founder of Babson College claimed that it had “the 
press, the pulpit and the schools” (cited in Cochran and Miller 1942: 343-44).   
The Resurgent of Laissez Faire Ideology Prior to 2008 
During the three decades leading up to 2008, the media -- newsprint, television, and radio 
-- became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few mega corporations, due in significant 
part to deregulation. For instance, the number of newspapers controlled by chains went up 
significantly as a result of relaxed ownership regulations (McPherson 2008: 165). Blethen notes 
that “The majority of our media are controlled by just five companies [such that] About one-third 
of the population now listens to radio stations owned by a single company....The 1996 
deregulation of radio virtually ended local ownership in that medium” (2004: B7). Increased 
corporate media concentration served to restrict criticisms of laissez-faire ideology and the 
corporate power structure.   
An important component of the increasing influence of conservative, free-market 
ideology was the proliferation and empowerment of conservative think tanks such that they came 
to outnumber their liberal counterparts by a ratio of two to one (Rich 2004: 206). By 2006 the 
Heritage Foundation alone had larger expenses than the largest four liberal think tanks combined. 
Corporate influence over higher education also dramatically increased (Perelman 2002; 
Washburn 2005).   18
In addition to greater support from think tanks and lobbyists, from the 1970s onward, 
academic economists provided increasing support to free-market ideology, thereby lending 
support to right-wing policies, even when such was not their intent. The mainstream economic 
canon became generally supportive of unfettered and thus unregulated markets, even when the 
consequence was greater inequality.
21 
Because of an elite’s increased command over ideology, the losers – the overwhelming 
majority of Americans – could not use the political process to stop the super-rich rip-off. 
Through the democratic process, in principle, they could have forced the creation of 
compensatory measures to relieve workers harmed by technological change or international 
trade. Taxes could have been restructured in their favor, and public services that benefit them 
could have been vastly expanded and improved. However, an elite’s increased control over the 
ideology infrastructure resulted in the majority buying into the rich’s ideology that such 
measures would not be to their own benefit.
22 As former chief economist at the International 
Monetary Fund, Simon Johnson, put it, “…the American financial industry gained political 
power by amassing a kind of cultural capital – a belief system…[such that] the attitude took hold 
that what was good for Wall Street was good for the country…. Faith in free financial markets 
grew into conventional wisdom – trumpeted on the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal 
and on the floor of Congress” (2009). 
Final Reflections 
  During the 1920s and the three decades prior to 2008, concern about rising inequality was 
widely dismissed as either irrelevant or missing the economic dynamism that inequality 
generates.
23 Its irrelevance, much of mainstream economics insisted, was that if everyone is 
becoming materially better off, the size of shares is unimportant.     19
  A broader understanding of the scope of what constitutes economic phenomena, 
however, reveals the myriad ways in which inequality is central to economic processes and even, 
as this study demonstrates, how its dynamics can set the stage for severe systemic dysfunction. 
Veblen’s theory of consumer behavior reveals how rising inequality generates a struggle to 
maintain social respectability through augmented consumption. A Keynesian/Kaleckian 
perspective reveals how rising inequality impairs aggregate demand and redirects investment 
away from the real economy into financial speculation. Marx’s theory of ideology shows how 
rising inequality enables an elite to gain increasing control over economic and political ideology.  
The crisis of 1929 marked a turning point, reversing rising inequality, and ushering in 
roughly four decades of democratically-driven policies that significantly lessened inequality and 
made possible what many consider a “golden age” of U.S. capitalism following World War Two. 
Might the crisis of 2008 promise to have similar long-run distributional and growth-dynamic 
consequences? Perhaps. As Milton Friedman put it, “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—
produces real change (1982: ix).   20
REFERENCES 
 
Bernanke, Ben S.  2000.  Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
   University  Press. 
 
Bernstein, Irving. 1966. The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-33. Boston: 
   Penguin Books. 
 
Bernstein, Michael A. 1998.  “The American Economy of the Interwar Era,” in Calvin Coolidge 
   and the Coolidge Era, John Earl Haynes, ed. Washington, D.C. Library of Congress: 
   191-213. 
 
Blanning, Tim. 2008. The Triumph of Music. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Blethen, Frank A.  2004.  “Stop the Media Mergers,” The Washington Post, September 19: B7. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre.  1984.  Distinction:  A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London:  
  Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Brown, Christopher. 2008.  Inequality, Consumer Credit and the Saving Puzzle.  Northampton, 
  Mass.: Edward Elgar. 
 
BLS: Current Employment Statistics. 2010 Bureau of Labor Statistics. Accessed May 20, 2010.   21
 http://www.bls.gov/cps/ 
 
Bucks, Brian K., Arthur B. Kennickell, and Kevin B. Moore. 2006. “Recent Changes in U.S. 
  Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.” 
  Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 92, February: A1-A38. 
 
Bucks, Brian K., Arthur B. Kennickell, Traci L. Mach, and Kevin B. Moore. 2009. “Changes in 
   U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances.” Federal 
 Reserve  Bulletin, vol. 95, February: A1-A55. 
 
Calder, Lendol.  1999.  Financing the American Dream: A cultural History of Consumer Credit. 
    Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Carey, Alex. 1995. Taking the Risk Out of Democracy. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
 
Carosso, Vincent P. 1970. International Banking in America, A History. Cambridge: Harvard 
   University Press.   
 
Cochran, Thomas C., and Wiliam Miller.  1942.  The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of 
   Industrial America. New York: Harper. 
 
Easterly, William.  2002.  The Elusive Quest for Growth.  Cambridge: MIT Press: 265. 
   22
Economic Report of the President of the United States. 2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S.   
   Government Printing Office. 
 
Edsforth, Ronald.  1998.  “Made in the U.S.A.: Mass Culture and the Americanization of  
   Working-Class Ethnics in the Coolidge Era,” in Calvin Coolidge and the Coolidge Era, 
   John Earl Haynes, ed. Washington, D.C. Library of Congress: 244-72. 
 
Faulkner, Harold Underwood.  1960. American Economic History. 8
th ed. New York: Harper and 
   Row.   
 
Frank, Robert H. 2000.  “Does Growing Inequality Harm the Middle Class?” Eastern Economic 
   Journal, 26 (3): 253-64. 
 
Frank, Robert.  2007.  Falling Behind:  How Rising Inequality Harms the Middle Class.  
   Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Friedman, Milton.  1962. Capitalism and Freedom.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.  
 
Galbraith, John Kenneth.  1954.  The Great Crash 1929.  New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L.  2006. "Corruption In America," Journal of Public Economics, 90(6-7), Aug: 
   1053-1072.  
   23
Grebler, Leo, David M. Blank and Louis Winick.  1956.  Capital Formation in Residential Real 
   Estate: Trends and Prospects.  Princeton: NBER and Princeton University Press. 
 
Greenspan, Alan.  2007.  The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World.  New York: 
 Penguin  Press. 
 
Hall, Thomas E. and J. David Ferguson.  1998.  The Great Depression: An International   
   Disaster of Perverse Economic Policies.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Hughes, Johnathan.  1987.  American Economic History. 2
nd ed. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman 
 and  Co. 
 
Johnson, Simon.  2009.  “The Quiet Coup,” The Atlantic Monthly Online, Available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice 
 
Keynes, John Maynard.  1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New 
   York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965.  
 
Livingston, James.  1994.  Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850-
 1940. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.   
 
Livingston, James.  2009.  “Their Great Depression and Ours,” Challenge, 52 (3), May/June: 34-
 51.   24
 
Long, Clarence D. 1960.  Wages and Earnings in the United States, 1860-1890.  Princeton: 
   Princeton University Press. 
 
Marx, Karl.  1846. AThe German Ideology@ in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader.  
   New York: W.W. Norton, 1978, 172, pp. 146-200. 
 
McPherson, James Brian. 2008. The Conservative Resurgence and the Press: The Media’s Role 
   in the Rise of the Right. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Miringoff, Marque-Luisa and Sandra Opdyke.  2008.  America’s Social Health:  Putting Social 
   Issues Back on the Public Agenda.  Armonk, New York:  M.E. Sharpe 
 
NIPA: National Income and Product Account (NIPA). 2010. Bureau of Economic Anaysis. 
   Available at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp 
 
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2004.  OECD Employment 
 Outlook  2004.  Paris: OECD. 
 
Olney, Martha L. 1991. Buy Now, Pay Later.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina. 
 
Perelman, Michael. 2002. Steal this Idea: The Corporate Confiscation of Creativity. New York: 
   Palgrave.   25
 
Pew Research Center 2008.  Available at http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=1282, March 27.  
Economic-discontent-deepens-as-inflation-concerns-rise, February 14. 
 
Phillips, Kevin (interview).  2002.  “Too Much Wealth, Too Little Democracy,” Challenge, 
   September/October, 6-20. 
 
Potter Jim. 1974.  The American Economy between the World Wars. London: Macmillan Press. 
 
Rawls, John . 1971.  A Theory of Justice.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Reich, Robert B.  2007.  Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and 
   Everyday Life, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Rich, Andrew. 2004. Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise. New York: 
   Cambridge University Press. 
 
Saez, Emmanuel.  2009. “Striking It Richer:  The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United   
   States.” (Update with 2007 estimates), Available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-
 UStopincomes-2007.pdf 
 
Sobel, Robert. 1968. The Great Bull Market: Wall Street in the 1920s. New York: W.W. Norton 
   and Co.   26
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2008.  “Realign the Interests of Wall Street,” Harper’s, November, 36-37. 
 
Stricker, Frank. 1983. AAffluence for Whom B Another Look at Prosperity and the Working 
   Classes in the 1920s,@ The Labor History Reader, ed. Daniel J. Leab. Urbana: 
University     of Illinois Press. 
 
Stricker, Frank.  1983-84. “Causes of the Great Depression, or What Reagan Doesn’t Know 
  About the 1920s,” Economic Forum, 14, winter: 41-58.  
 
Temin, Peter.  1976.  Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression?  New York: Norton. 
 
Temin, Peter.  1991.  Lessons from the Great Depression.  Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
Washburn, Jennifer. 2005. University Inc. The Corporate Corruption of American Higher  
   Education. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Watts, Sarah Lyons. Order Against Chaos: Business Culture and Labor Ideology in America 
   1880  B 1915. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. 
 
Wenning, Todd.  2008.  “What to Sell in This Market,” The Motley Fool, Nov. 21,   Available at 
    http://www.fool.com/investing/value/2009/03/02/what-to-sell-in-this-market.aspx 
   27
Western, David L. 2004.  Booms, Bubbles and Busts in US Stock Markets. London: Routledge. 
 
White, Eugene N.  1990. “The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited,” Journal of 
   Economic Perspectives, 4 (2), Spring: 67-83. 
 
Wilkinson, Richard, and Kate Pickett.  2009. The Spirit Level:  Why More Equal Societies 
   Almost Always Do Better.  London: Allen Lane. 
 
Williamson, Jeffrey G. and Peter H. Lindert. 1980. "Long-Term Trends in American Wealth 
   Inequality," NBER Chapters, in: Modeling the Distribution and Intergenerational   
   Transmission of Wealth, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc: 9-94. 
 
Wilmers, Robert G. 2009.  “Where the Crisis Came From,” The Washington Post, June 27: A19. 
 
Wisman, Jon D.  2009.  “Household Saving, Class Identity, and Conspicuous Consumption,” 
   Journal of Economic Issues, 63 (1), March: 89-114. 
 
Wisman, Jon D. and James F. Smith. “Legitimating Inequality:  Fooling Most of the People All 
   of the Time,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology (forthcoming April 2011). 
 
Wolff, Edward. 2004. “Changes in Household Wealth in the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S.” 
   Working Paper, The Levy Economics Institute. Available at       





































                                                           
1 A glance at highly influential treatises on the Great Depression, e.g., Bernanke (2000) and 
Temin (1976; 1991) finds no mention of a role for inequality in the generation of that crisis. A 
few exceptions can be found among more heterodox economists, e.g., Hughes 1987, Faulkner 
1960, Potter 1974, Livingston 1994, and Stricker 1983-84.  
 
2 Business spending on advertising increased from $2.28 billion in 1919 to $3.43 billion in 1929 
(Olney 1991: 137), keeping the consumption practices of the super wealthy ever on display.  
 
3 “Shoestring mortgages” enabled property to be bought on margin. The expansion of such credit 
instruments unhinged the traditional relationship between income and spending (Olney 1991:   30
                                                                                                                                                                                           
130-31).    
 
4 A “free-to-choose” interpretation does not adequately capture the dynamics of this 
intensified struggle.  People do, of course, choose. However, as Robert Frank has noted, their 
choices are socially constrained: 
“Increased spending at the top of the income distribution has not only imposed 
psychological costs on families in the middle, it has also raised the cost of achieving 
many basic goals. Few middle-income parents, for example, would be comfortable 
knowing that their children were attending below-average schools.  Yet the amount that 
any given family must spend to avoid that outcome depends strongly on the amounts that 
others spend….  [Moreover], people cannot send their children to a public school of even 
average quality if they buy a home in a school district in which house prices are well 
below average” (2000: 258). 
 
5  The argument set forth here is directly opposite that of Keynes (1936: 372-75). For Keynes, an 
increase in inequality is expected to increase saving since wealthier households have higher 
marginal propensities to save than do the less-well off. What Keynes failed to take into account 
is the manner in which rising inequality pressures all households beneath the top to increase 
consumption to maintain their relative social status. For an extended discussion of Veblen’s 
theory of consumer behavior applied to U.S. saving behavior, see Brown 2008; Wisman 2009. 
 
6 Calder notes that “By 1930, installment credit financed the sales of 60-75 percent of 
automobiles, 80-90 percent of furniture, 75 percent of washing machines, 65 percent of vacuum   31
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cleaners, 18-25 percent of jewelry, 75 percent of radio sets, and 80 percent of phonographs” 
(1999: 201).   
  
7  Wenning (2008) notes that much of the debt taken on between 2000 and 2007 was spent on 
SUVs, huge TVs, granite countertops, and other luxury goods.  Increased availability of credit 
instruments such as credit cards and home equity loans greatly facilitated this emulative 
consumption (Scott 2007).   
 
8 Supporting this relationship between inequality and indebtedness, Frank (2007) has found that 
in those parts of the U.S. where inequality had most risen over a ten-year period, bankruptcy 
rates also rose most. 
 
9 There was a high-tech revolution led by companies such as RCA during the 1920s that gave the 
period a character not unlike the late 1990s (Western 2004: 166). 
 
10 Williamson and Lindert have estimated that technological innovation during the 1920s 
increased the premium for skilled labor by 0.98 percent per year (1980: 247). 
 
11  Between 1923 and 1929 weekly earnings declined about 20 percent in manufacturing, and 
about eight percent in steel production (Bernstein 1966, 66-67). Wages as a percentage of value-
added in manufacturing fell from 45.0 in 1923 to 36.9 in 1929 (Bernstein 1998: 198). 
  
12 Suggesting a dearth of good investment options for retained earnings, dividends as a share of   32
                                                                                                                                                                                           
national income rose from 4.3 percent in 1920 to 7.2 percent 1929. About 82 percent of these 
dividends were paid to the wealthiest 5 percent of Americans (Hall and Ferguson 1998: 21). 
 
13 Manufacturing represented 21.2 percent of GDP in 1974, but only 12.1 percent in 2004 
(Economic Report of the President 2006: Table B12,  296-97).   
 
14  According to Hall and Ferguson, between 1922 and 1929, “the share of wealth held by the top 
1 percent of adults rose from 32 percent to 38 percent. In 1922 the top 1 percent of income 
recipients accounted for 49 percent of total U.S. saving; by 1929 they accounted for 80 percent 
of saving” (1998: 21). 
 
15  Hall and Ferguson argue that the mild deflation during the 1920s (an average of about 0.5 
percent per year between 1921 and 1929 was traceable to the fact that the expansion in aggregate 
supply outpaced increases in aggregate demand (1998: 18). 
 
16 Galbraith reported that, in a population of 120 million, only one and a half million “had an 
active association of any sort with the stock market” (1954: 78). 
 
17 Bernstein claims that “Margin-buying was the rule not the exception [and] brokers often 
allowed as much as 80 percent of the value of a stock purchase to be borrowed… frequently 
extended in the absence of any formal check on the credit-worthiness of the customer involved” 
(1998: 197).   
   33
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Prior to both crises, foreign funds flowed into the U.S., helping fuel credit expansion. Leading 
up to 1929, the U.S. and France required that Germany pay its war reparations in gold, creating a 
net gold inflow into the U.S. and  increasing the availability of credit (Bernstein 1998: 204). 
Leading up to 2008, the underinvestment in the goods-producing sector led to a weak export 
sector and increasing imports, generating an increasingly large trade deficit.  These dollars 
abroad flowed back into the U.S. financial system, helping keep interest rates low and fueling 
profitability, while impeding the value of the dollar from substantially falling, thereby allowing 
the trade deficit to grow further as exports remained expensive and imports cheap.  
 
19 Financial innovation fueling the housing boom before the 2008 financial crisis included 
adjustable-rate mortgages, interest-only loans, 100 percent-plus mortgages. Other financial 
innovations included mortgage-backed securities, derivatives, credit default swaps, and exotics. 
A bubble in the derivatives market was fueled by the housing bubble. 
 
20 Veblen believed that because the elite are emulated, their ideology would carry special weight: 
“The fact that the usages, actions, and views of the well-to-do leisure class acquire the character 
of a prescriptive canon of conduct for the rest of society, gives added weight and reach to the 
conservative influence of that class.  It makes it incumbent upon all reputable people to follow 
their lead” (Veblen 1899: 200).   
 
21 For a discussion of the manner in which economic science has served to legitimate inequality, 
see Wisman and Smith (forthcoming). 
   34
                                                                                                                                                                                           
22  As former secretary of labor, Robert Reich asserts, “As inequality has widened, the means 
America once used to temper it – progressive income taxes, good public schools, trade unions 
that bargain for higher wages – have eroded” (2007: 4). 
 
23 This claim, however, has not withstood critical scrutiny (e.g., Easterly 2002).   